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The Supreme Court in 2016 
The personnel 
The only change to the composition of the Supreme Court during 2016 was the retirement of Lord 
Toulson in September. The Court decided not to immediately appoint a replacement but to await 
the retirement of Lord Neuberger (the President) and Lord Clarke in the summer of 2017. Lords 
Hughes, Mance and Sumption are due to retire in 2018. A competition to find three replacement 
Justices is to begin early in 2017 and a second competition for three more early in 2018.  
In the meantime Lord Toulson and Lord Dyson (who retired as Master of the Rolls in 2016) have 
joined the Supplementary Panel of retired senior judges who can sit in the Supreme Court as and 
when required. They are eligible to do so until they reach the age of 75 or until five years have 
elapsed since they last held office as a senior judge. Two retired Scottish judges, Lord Gill and Lord 
Hamilton, are already members of the Panel.  
The output 
In 2016 the Supreme Court issued 65 sets of judgments, a noticeably lower figure than in 2015 
(when it was 79). Six of the judgments related to two, or in one case three, conjoined appeals, and 
two sets of judgments related to the same appeal (Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43 and 44). Moreover 
one case was not an appeal but an application to vacate a previous judgment (Bancoult (No 2) [2016] 
UKSC 35). Altogether, then, 70 appeals were decided.  Of these, 32 were successful in whole or in 
part (46%). Three appeals resulted in questions being referred to the Court of Justice of the EU. 
Six of the 65 cases involved appeals from Scotland (11 in 2015), with just two from Northern Ireland 
(3 in 2015). The cases from Scotland did not have to be preceded by an express grant of permission. 
Of the other appeals, all but one appear to have come to the Supreme Court as a result of 
permission being granted by a committee of the Court itself rather than by a lower court. Three of 
the 70 appeals were leapfrog appeals which by-passed the Court of Appeal, but in each of them 
permission to proceed in this way was granted by the Supreme Court.     
The judgments 
Seven of the 65 sets of judgments involved benches of seven Justices and two (the two decisions in 
Willers v Joyce) involved nine Justices, the first such case since the assisted suicide case of Nicklinson 
two years earlier ([2014 UKSC 38). All of the other 56 cases were decided by five Justices, including, 
surprisingly, R v Jogee [2014] UKSC 8, where for the first time ever the highest UK court sat together 
with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to hear conjoined appeals from England and a 
foreign jurisdiction (Jamaica).  
The trend towards single judgments continued apace. No fewer than 44 of the 65 sets of judgments 
took the form of a single judgment, the highest ever percentage (68%). There were two other cases 
where there was essentially a single judgment supplemented by a very short additional judgment of 
just a couple of paragraphs. One of the cases involving nine Justices, and four of the cases involving 
seven Justices, were dealt with by a single judgment. Three of the single judgments were jointly 
authored by two or, in one case, three Justices.  
The most prolific authors of single judgments, with five apiece, were Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale (the 
Deputy President) and Lord Sumption. All Justices except Lord Clarke (who delivered none) delivered 
at least two single judgments.  
In 12 of the 65 cases (18%), at least one Justice dissented. In five of those two of the five Justices 
dissented, in one of the 7-judge decisions two Justices dissented and in one of the 9-judge decisions 
the split was 5 v 4. The Justice who dissented most often was Lord Clarke, doing so on four 
occasions. Only Lords Hodge, Hughes and Wilson did not dissent at all.  
The prominent issues 
As usual public law featured frequently. Thirteen cases were judicial reviews of administrative 
action, 11 concerned immigration, deportation or extradition and 11 raised human rights or 
discrimination arguments. Nine cases dealt with matters of EU law. Six focused on criminal law and a 
further six on insurance law. There were four cases each on family law, taxation law and social 
security law.    
Three cases attracted considerable publicity during the year. The first was R v Jogee, which led some 
newspapers to suggest that many prisoners serving long sentences for involvement in serious crimes 
would be able to have their convictions quashed on the basis that their foresight of what the 
principal offender might do in the course of a joint enterprise did not necessarily mean that other 
persons involved in the activity intended to assist and encourage what the principal then did. In fact, 
although several such appeals have since been brought, the success rate has not been high. The 
decision exemplified the anomaly that important parts of the criminal law are still based on common 
law rather than on legislation. Likewise, in R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61 the Supreme Court held that 
when considering a defence of diminished responsibility a jury does not need to be directed on what 
constitutes a ‘substantial’ impairment of mind.   
In Jogee the Supreme Court did not expressly apply the 1966 Practice Statement, whereby the 
highest court can ‘depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so’. But in a case 
decided less than a week later the Court did expressly apply that Statement in Knauer v Ministry of 
Justice [2016] UKSC 9, where a 7-judge Court departed from two previous House of Lords decisions 
and ruled that the date from which the multiplier for future loss should be calculated in a claim for 
loss of dependency should be the date of trial and not the date of death.  
Secondly, in PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26 four of the five Justices upheld an 
interim injunction obtained by a famous entertainer to prevent the disclosure of his extra-marital 
sexual activities, even though the material had already been published in Scotland and North 
America. The majority stressed that rights to privacy and free speech have to be balanced on a case 
by case basis and that privacy deserves more protection than confidentiality whenever a person’s 
family may be affected by the disclosure, especially when the information in question is of limited 
public interest (even if it is of great interest to the public). Lord Toulson dissented on the basis that 
the cat was already out of the bag and he could not agree that publishing information on the 
internet was not as intrusive and distressing as publishing it in English newspapers. 
Thirdly, in the bedroom tax case of R (MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 
58 the Court held that the government’s capping of housing benefit went too far in cases involving 
people with a disability. There was no good reason for the distinction made by Regulation B13 of the 
Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 between adult partners who cannot share a bedroom because of 
disability and children who cannot do so because of disability, nor for that between adults and 
children in need of an overnight carer. However, against the strong dissent of Lady Hale, the Court 
also held that the Regulation did not unjustifiably discriminate against women who are living in 
accommodation specially adapted to protect them against a severe risk of domestic violence. 
Other important decisions 
In a year when the Brexit vote prompted litigation over whether the government could use 
prerogative powers to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, a case decided in January 2016 
confirmed that the Foreign Secretary’s power to list someone as a person whose UK assets should be 
frozen did not breach any common law principle (distinguishing the famous case of Entick v 
Carrington, 1765) and had to be reviewed only in accordance with ordinary judicial review principles 
rather than on a merits basis (Youssef [2016] UKSC 3). But in another case the Public Law Project 
succeeded in convincing the Supreme Court that regulations restricting civil legal aid to persons who 
have been lawfully resident in the UK for at least a year are ultra vires the parent Act ([2016] UKSC 
39).  
On the human rights front the Supreme Court reasserted in McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 
that, when dealing with a claim for possession of land by a private sector owner against a residential 
occupier, a judge is not required to consider the proportionality of the eviction under human rights 
law. This is another consequence of the rather absurd situation whereby only public authorities have 
to comply with human rights law while both public and private authorities have to comply with 
equality law. In Bancoult (No 2) [2016] UKSC 35 an attempt to vacate an earlier House of Lords 
decision on the eviction of Chagos Islanders from their homeland, on the basis that important 
evidence had allegedly been withheld from the Law Lords, narrowly failed, but only because Lord 
Mance, who had dissented in the earlier case, did not maintain the same line in the later case. In 
Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51 the Court ruled that Part 4 of the Children and 
Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, passed by the Scottish Parliament supposedly to help safeguard 
children from abuse, was incompatible with children’s right to privacy under both the ECHR and EU 
law. And in Johnson [2016] UKSC 56 a provision in the Immigration Act 2014 was found to be 
incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR because it discriminated against the children of 
parents who were not married at the time of their birth.   
The Court also struck down a scheme designed to avoid the payment of income tax on bankers’ 
bonuses (UBS AG V HMRC [2016] UKSC 13) but held that the HMRC had wrongly disclosed 
information to a journalist about the tax affairs of a company (R (Ingenious Media Holdings) v HMRC 
[2016] UKSC 54).             
In Willers v Joyce, the most closely contested case of the year, the Supreme Court and Privy Council 
jointly held, by 5 v 4, that the tort of malicious prosecution can be used not just in the wake of 
criminal proceedings but also after civil proceedings. The majority favoured a recent precedent set 
by the Privy Council to a much older one set by the House of Lords and in a separate set of 
judgments the Justices ruled unanimously that, if an appeal to the Privy Council involves an issue of 
English law on which a previous decision of an appellate court in the UK is challenged, the Privy 
Council may rule that the previous decision was wrong and that the Privy Council’s decision should 
from then on be treated as the binding precedent.     
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